Angelika Bammer and Hazel Gold, Now You See It, Now You Don't: Scientists, Humanists, and Collective Memory
What exactly do we mean when say “collective memory” and how might individuals’ personal memories of an event converge into a cohesive memory maintained by a group? This was the central inquiry of the second CMBC Faculty Lunch Discussion of the spring 2015 semester, titled “Now you see it, now you don’t: scientists, humanists, and collective memory” and led by Dr. Angelika Bammer (Institute for Liberal Arts, Emory University) and Dr. Hazel Gold (Spanish and Portuguese, Emory University). In the fall of 2014, Drs. Bammer and Gold co-taught a CMBC sponsored seminar called “Mapping Memory: History, Culture, and the Brain ”, the purpose of which was to examine how our memories of the past shape the present from a cross-disciplinary perspective. The class struggled with how to approach collective memory from an interdisciplinary perspective, failing to reach a satisfying resolution by the semester’s end. Drs. Bammer and Gold reviewed this struggle in the lunch discussion, and raised questions about how to best define and conceptualize collective memory.
The “Mapping Memory” class was organized around two aims. The first aim was to foster an open inquiry into relationships between memory, the past, and the present from a variety of disciplinary perspectives. The second aim was to use the assumptions and approaches of one discipline as a check on the accepted premises and methods from another discipline. These aims worked well for the class at the outset of the semester, as the class examined the processes of memory and forgetting within individual minds. The class studied memory and forgetting from a neurobiological perspective, reading case studies and scientific research to understand how memories are encoded and retrieved at a neuronal level. Approaching these questions through a humanities lens, the class also looked at how individual acts of memory are represented in literary texts, film, and art. For example, the class read the Jorge Luis Borges story, “Funes the Memorious”, about a boy who acquires the ability to remember every detail of his life, down to the shape of every cloud he sees in the sky. The protagonist’s experience is similar to that of people living with Highly Superior Autobiographical memory, a rare condition whose existence invites questions about the limits of memory capacity in the human brain.
When the class began investigating the question of
collective memory, it ran into difficulty reconciling perspectives from the
humanities and the sciences. The term ‘collective memory’ was first coined by
the sociologist and philosopher Maurice Halbwachs in the 1950s and refers to
the larger social framework in which individual memories are believed to be
constructed and embedded. Halbwachs argues that memory is largely a social act,
given that many of our memories are laid down and recalled in social settings
and for social purposes. Halbwachs asserts that memory is often invoked in
response to questions posed by others, and that we assume others’ perspective
in formulating a response. Hence, group membership informs the encoding and
retrieval of memories, such that memories are formulated within a larger social
framework, rather than in individual minds. According to Halbwachs
(Halbwachs,1992):
There is no point in seeking
where they [memories] are preserved in my brain or in some nook of my mind to
which I alone have access: for they are recalled to me externally, and the
groups of which I am a part at any time give me the means to reconstruct them,
upon condition, to be sure, that I turn toward them and adopt, at least for the
moment, their way of thinking… It is in this sense that there exists a
collective memory and social frameworks for memory; it is to the degree that
our individual thought places itself in these frameworks and participates in
this memory that it is capable of the act of recollection.
To understand how collective memory would be approached by
cognitive scientists, Drs. Gold and Bammer invited Dr. Daniel Schacter
(Psychology, Harvard University) to visit Emory and speak with their class. Dr.
Schacter has researched and written extensively on the topic of memory, and
often appeals to the humanities in his own writing. Drs. Gold and Bammer
believed the visit could prove fruitful for synthesizing a richer understanding
of collective memory by forging a bridge between the humanities and the sciences.
While Dr. Schacter was familiar with the term ‘collective memory’, he does not
recognize it as a useful or meaningful construct in the field of cognitive
science. He understands the term to be used metaphorically, and does not
believe it can be operationalized and measured in an experimental setting. Dr.
Schacter’s objection to ‘collective memory’ as a meaningful construct in the
sciences compelled Dr. Gold and Bammer’s class to reflect on collective memory
and try to make more sense of it—reflections which were actively discussed in
the CMBC lunch talk.
A central challenge in defining and understanding collective
memory is how to delineate the ambiguous boundary between individual and
collective memories. This inquiry leads to questions about ownership of
memories--when is a memory an entity we can claim individual ownership over,
and when and how does it become collective? Dr. Robyn Fivush (Psychology, Emory
University) attended the talk and argued that we are born into cultures that
prescribe the way we should live our lives and form our memories. As a result,
our memories are heavily shaped and constrained by cultural stories and
definitions from the very beginning of our lives, such that it may be difficult
to speak of veritable ‘individual’ memories that exist outside of a
sociocultural framework.
The boundary between individual and collective memories is
also murky when we stop to consider how a cohesive collective memory emerges
from the individuals’ disparate experiences of an event. In the CMBC faculty
lunch discussion, attendees all shared their personal experiences of 9/11, an
exercise which revealed that many people’s recollections activated associated
memories of tangential events and people. When and how do all these personal
memories of an event like 9/11, each with their own complex web of associations
and memories, hang together and become the collective memory we speak of when
we say “never forget” 9/11? In discussing this issue, Dr. Bammer also raised
questions about what gets lost as this collective memory emerges, and what
happens to all the individual memories along the way?
Defining ownership over individual and collective memories
in turn raises questions about the transmission of memories across time and
space. Can individuals claim to have access to a collective memory of an event
for which they were not present? For example, children born after 9/11 will
have had no first-hand experience of the event, but will hear others’ accounts
and be exposed to media coverage of the event many times throughout their
lives. Do we acknowledge these children as having shared ownership of the
collective memory of 9/11? Many attendees participating in the discussion
endorsed the belief that intergenerational memories constitute collective memory,
for the experiences of an event are effectively shared and constitute memories
that are central to people’s identities. If collective memories can be claimed
to extend to individuals who do not have first-hand experience of the event,
they would stand in sharp contrast with Dr. Schacter’s definition of memory. In
Searching for Memory: The Brain, the
Mind, and the Past, Schacter explains “In order to be experienced as a
memory, the retrieved information must be recollected in the context of a
particular time and place and with some reference to oneself as a participant
in the episode” (Schacter, 2008, p.17).
Defining collective memory also raises thorny questions
about the reliability of memories and whether the term ‘story’ may be more
appropriate than ‘memory’ in some contexts. When events are transmitted across
generations, details may be added, altered, or dropped, calling into question
the verisimilitude of the memory. Hence, it may be argued that memories that
have been altered in various ways may be more accurately described as
‘stories’. This does not necessarily discriminate collective memories from
individual ones. Dr. Gold pointed out that individual memories are altered when
they are reconstructed by the mind, and that individual memory is also fallible
in all kinds of ways—a point that Dr. Schacter raised himself in his talk on
the seven sins of memory when he was visiting Emory. Thus, fallibility should
not necessarily be a reason to deem collective memory any less valid than
individual memory from a scientific perspective.
Although Dr. Schacter was not amenable to the idea of
‘collective memory’ from the perspective of a scholar in the cognitive
sciences, his visit ultimately proved to be generative for the class. Dr.
Bammer explained that the students were frustrated with Dr. Schacter’s
response, and that it motivated them to tackle “richer, more nuanced, more
risky, more experimental projects” probing questions concerned with collective
memory. For example, one student examined how collective memories of the Irish
famine are represented in Irish literature and how these memories may be
affecting the way people experience the current economic crisis. Many
unresolved questions remain concerning how to define and understand collective
memory, but Drs. Gold and Bammer’s class and the CMBC faculty lunch discussion
made progress in hashing out these questions and opening a dialogue about how
to address them from a cross-disciplinary perspective.
References
Halbwachs, M. (1992). On Collective Memory. University of Chicago Press.
Schacter, D. L. (2008). Searching for Memory: The Brain, Th. Basic Books.
